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Abstract
In this paper, we use Weil’s [1989] overlapping inﬁnitely-lived dy-
nasties framework to analyse a microfounded version of the real balance
eﬀect envisaged by Pigou. This eﬀect appears to imply that temporary
monetary expansions in the limit have an unboundedly large impact
on current aggregate demand, thereby eliminating Krugman’s liquid-
ity trap. The circumstances under which such an eﬀect is operative,
however, imply a condition that rules out temporary monetary expan-
sions of this magnitude. For the set of feasible temporary monetary
expansions, rather than eliminating the possibility of liquidity traps oc-
curring, the real balance eﬀect generated by this model makes a trap
perhaps more likely due to the heightened constraints it imposes on
the monetary authority.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The theme of this paper is an old one: how can the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates represent a plausible threat to stabilisation policy
when increases in real balances — regardless of the level of the nominal inter-
est rate — raise household wealth and therefore consumption, as described
by Pigou’s [1943] argument for a “real balance eﬀect”? The traditional cri-
tique of this particular real balance eﬀect, due to Kalecki [1944], concerns
its likely (lack of) empirical signiﬁcance. As the largest part of private hold-
ings of monetary assets, including bank deposits and so on, have direct or
indirect counterparts in private debt, the net base for this eﬀect will be a
small fraction of the economy’s overall stock of wealth. Nevertheless, from
a purely theoretical perspective, the existence of this simple wealth eﬀect
of monetary policy represents an important challenge to the possibility of
liquidity traps occurring.
Indeed, this challenge appears to have strongly inﬂuenced Paul Krug-
man’s decision to employ a dynamic general equilibrium framework in his
initial papers on the topic (Krugman [1998a], [1998b]). The following is a
quote from Krugman [1999]:
Here’s how my initial argument — not that diﬀerent from the
debates between Keynes and Pigou — went. In the IS-LM model
... to say that increases in M were ineﬀective beyond some point
was ... equivalent to saying that reductions in P were ineﬀec-
tive in raising demand — that the aggregate demand curve (was)
downward-sloping over some range but vertical thereafter.
But as Pigou pointed out, that simply cannot be right. If nothing
else, a fall in the overall price level increases the real value of the
public’s holdings of money, and this wealth eﬀect will increase
consumption. If the IS-LM model seems to suggest that no full
employment equilibrium exists, it is only because that model
does not really get the budget constraints right.
To demonstrate the truth of that supposed truism, all that was
needed was to write down a model that got the budget con-
2straints right, that did not fudge the individual’s decision prob-
lem. So I set out to write down the simplest such model I could.
And it ended up saying something quite diﬀerent.
To Krugman’s evident surprise, his representative agent, cash-in-advance
framework did not generate the real balance eﬀect he anticipated. This re-
sult is not, we should note, a consequence of erroneous budget constraints
or an ad hoc decision problem. The crucial equilibrium condition in his
framework — the Euler equation for the optimal timing of private expendi-
ture — does not in any way contradict the contribution of ﬁnancial wealth to
the intertemporal budget constraint. Rather, money aﬀects aggregate de-
mand in this set-up only through its eﬀects upon real interest rates and the
incentives that they provide for intertemporal subsitution of expenditure.
This strong conclusion about how the transmission mechanism operates,
we should note, is not a general property shared by all optimising models. As
is well known, both the money-in-the-utility function (MIUF) and shopping
time approaches to modelling money demand can plausibly generate a type
of real balance eﬀect operating through the cross-partial derivative of the
utility function ucm. If utility is obtained from holding money, this must be
because money balances facilitate transactions and it is hardly sensible that
the beneﬁts of such balances should be independent of the real volume of
transactions that a household undertakes. In particular, it is plausible that
the marginal beneﬁt of additional real balances should be higher when real
transactions are greater, implying ucm > 0.T h i ss u g g e s t st h ee x i s t e n c eo fa
real balance eﬀect as temporary increases in the current supply of money will
directly raise current aggregate demand through the cross partial derivative.
Woodford [2002] and McCallum [2000] discuss this possibility and ar-
gue that reasonable parameterisations of the utility function lead to very
small coeﬃcients on money in the IS equation. To be exact, this last re-
mark applies only to the money coeﬃcient in a log-linearised version of the
3IS curve. Regardless of the quantitative importance of this eﬀect near the
steady state, Woodford [2002] persuasively argues that this real balance ef-
fect would disappear completely in a liquidity trap. When there is satiation
in real balances at some ﬁnite level, it would seem perverse to argue that fur-
ther increases in real balances beyond the satiation point make transactions
more convenient.
Real balance eﬀects can also emerge in MIUF economies with alternative
timing speciﬁcations for the money balances entering the utility function.
Aikman [2002] demonstrates this for Carlstrom and Fuerst’s recently sug-
gested speciﬁcation (Carlstrom and Fuerst [2001]), although intriguingly, the
eﬀect works in exactly the opposite direction from that described above: a
temporary increase in the current money supply lowers the marginal utility
of liquidity and this in turn lowers aggregate demand for a given real in-
terest rate. Neither eﬀect, therefore, corresponds closely to the pure wealth
eﬀect envisaged by Pigou.
In this paper, we extend Krugman’s sticky-price, cash-in-advance model
to a framework due to Weil [1989], [1991] hybrid of the representative agent
Sidrauski and overlapping generations (OLG) approaches, in which new dy-
nasties of inﬁnitely-lived agents enter the economy each period. With a
growing population, the model generates a real balance eﬀe c tt h a tc l o s e l y
resembles the one advanced by Pigou: a temporary increase in the current
stock of money raises aggregate demand independently of its eﬀect on the
equilibrium real interest rate. Furthermore, this eﬀect operates through net
wealth. Following the work of Sachs [1980], Cohen [1985] and Weil [1991], we
show that the economy’s net per capita stock of monetary wealth is positive
only in the case where new, ﬁnancially disconnected cohorts are entering
the population. In Krugman’s representative agent framework, therefore,
money is not actually net wealth.
The paper most closely related to our own is Ireland [2001]. Using the
4same Weil [1989] overlapping generations framework, Ireland ﬁnds that the
real balance eﬀect completely eliminates the possibility of liquidity traps
occurring. His version of the liquidity trap, however, diﬀers quite substan-
tially from Krugman’s. In particular, rather than examining the constraints
on monetary policy imposed by the zero lower bound when the economy
experiences a large adverse shock, Ireland conﬁnes his analysis to the steady
state of an economy in which the central bank is following the Friedman
rule. With steady state zero nominal interest rates, the cash-in-advance
constraint ceases to bind and there exists, in the representative agent model,
multiple equilibrium values of real balances (and hence also multiple equi-
librium time paths for the price level) that are consistent with the steady
state conditions. Hence, the central bank’s choice of an initial value for the
nominal money supply plus a steady state growth rate is not suﬃcient to
determine a unique equilibrium time path for the price level. Introducing
population growth eliminates this multiplicity by making the steady state
real interest rate depend on the level of real balances. Our paper, we argue,
is closer to being a direct extension of Krugman’s work to an OLG economy.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 will lay out
the basic model, which is nothing but a discrete-time, sticky-price version of
Weil [1991] and in section 3, we characterise the current interest rate-output
conjuncture and describe how the real balance eﬀect operates. The main
part of the analysis is contained in section 4, which examines the possibility
of liquidity traps occurring. To preview the conclusions brieﬂy: with pop-
ulation growth, temporary monetary expansions can have an unboundedly
large impact on demand; expansions of such magnitude, however, are ruled
out as the lump-sum tax required to contract the money supply next pe-
riod will be so high that future generations will be unable to pay the tax
and consume. Within the set of feasible temporary monetary expansions,
liquidity traps are possible and, under our simple calibration of the model,
5more likely with an operative real balance eﬀect!
2 The Model
We begin by presenting a sticky-price, discrete time version of Weil’s [1991]
monetary, overlapping inﬁnitely-loved dynasties framework. The model
builds on the Blanchard [1985] uncertain-horizons framework, which itself
builds on Yaari [1965], and it provides a convenient vehicle for nesting the
representative agent and OLG approaches.
2.1 Demographic Structure
We assume that the economy is composed of distinct, inﬁnitely-lived dynas-
ties that come into being on diﬀerent dates. Households born in a particular
period υ ≥ 0 belong to cohort υ and the arrival of new cohorts causes the
total number of households to grow at the constant rate n ≥ 0.D e ﬁne Ns
as the population of households during period s. Then, given a positive
population (normalised to one) at the origin of time, s =0 ,w eh a v e :
Ns+1 =( 1+n)Ns (1)
∀s ≥ 0. As we discuss, the population growth rate n serves as a measure
of ﬁnancial disconnectedness and heterogeneity in the population. In the
special case of n =0 , the model collapses to the more familiar inﬁnitely-
lived representative agent model.
Households in a particular cohort are identical, so it is possible to exam-
ine the behaviour of a representative agent within each cohort.
62.2 Household υ’s Maximisation Problem






























+ ys + τs − cυ
s (3)
This utility function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, strictly
concave and continuously diﬀerentiable. The stock of real balances enters
as a direct argument in the agent’s utility function because of the liquidity
services facilitating transaction making that money provides. This shortcut
for incorporating money into general equilibrium models is widespread and
is adopted for example by two recent graduate texts in this ﬁeld (Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ [1996] and Walsh [1998]).
There is one consumption good at each date with price P, cs therefore
being the individual’s real consumption of this good on date s. There are
two assets in the economy: ﬁat money M and bonds B oﬀering a one-period
nominal return i (is ≥ 0 ∀s), and each period the government makes a lump-
sum real transfer of τ to the agent. Notice that both y and τ are taken to be
the same for all agents alive. A note on the timing convention adopted: Bυ
s+1
denotes individual υ’s nominal bond holdings at the beginning of period s+1,
i.e. prior to that period’s interest payment; Mυ
s though represents the same
individual’s nominal cash holdings at the beginning of period s +1 .
Deﬁne household υ’s real cum dividend ﬁnancial wealth available at the












7A key assumption of the model is that new cohorts are not linked to pre-
existing cohorts through operative gifts, as captured by the initial condition
as
s =0∀s>0 (with a0
0 > 0).
















Ps represents “full consumption” — the sum of
consumption on goods plus the opportunity cost of holding ﬁnancial wealth
in monetary form (see Sachs [1980]). Given this set-up, we also require a





j=s+1 (1 + rj)
≥ 0 (6)
This standard problem in dynamic optimisation yields the following well-

















































s=υ and the initial condition of zero ﬁnancial wealth at birth,
conditions (7), (8), (9), (5) and (10) fully characterise this household’s op-
timal program.
82.2.1 Household υ’s Consumption Function
In order to derive a closed form expression for this household’s consumption
function we must ﬁrst specify preferences. We opt for the rather restrictive















Additive separability allows us to abstract from an alternative real bal-
ance eﬀect working through the cross derivative term, ucm, as discussed in
the introduction, while logarithmic utility facilitates the algebra involved in
solving for the household’s consumption function.
Combining (11) with (7) and (8) gives:
cυ












Notice that under this set of preferences, full consumption will simply be




and as a result its dynamics will also be governed by (12).
Equation (5) can be recursively solved forward from date s ≥ υ to obtain













j=s+1 (1 + rj)
(yi + τi) (15)
1The aggregation procedure we adopt later on restricts us to using homothetic prefer-
ences in any case.
9where
Qs
j=s+1 (1 + rj)
−1 is interpreted as 1,
Qs+1
j=s+1 (1 + rj)
−1 as (1 + rs+1)
−1
and so on.
Combining (15) with (12) and (14) leads to household υ’s optimal full
consumption at date s:
b cυ
s =( 1− β)(aυ





j=s+1(1+rj) (yi + τi) is the human wealth of cohort υ as
of date s ≥ υ. G i v e n( 1 4 ) ,i ti sas t r a i g h t f o r w a r dm a t t e rt os o l v ef o rt h e




s + hs) (17)
where κ ≡
1−β
1+χ is the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Full
consumption is thus simply proportional to the sum of human and nonhuman
wealth, following the permanent income hypothesis.
2.3 Per Capita Relationships
For any variable, xυ
s, the corresponding per-capita variable at date s,d e n o t e d










Applying this linear aggregation procedure to expressions (16), (13), (4),
(5) and to the relationship between consumption and full consumption (14),
one derives the following:
b cs =( 1− β)[as + hs] (19)
2Vintage υ =0has N0 =1members. Total population next period is N1;o ft h i s
total, N1 − N0 =( 1 + n) − 1 are of vintage υ =1 . Similarly, vintage υ =2contains
N2 − N1 =( 1+n)
2 − (1 + n)=n(1 + n) members, and so on. Total population at date






















(at + yt + τt − b ct) (22)






While (19), (20) and (21) are straightforward analogs of (16), (13) and
(4), a comparison of (22) to (5) reveals that per capita ﬁnancial wealth grows
at a slower rate than each individual household’s ﬁnancial wealth, as newly
born households start their lives without money and bonds by assumption.
This property (also present in Blanchard [1985]) plays a crucial role in our
results.
2.3.1 The Per Capita Consumption Euler Equation
When we attempt to convert the household consumption Euler equation
(12) into per capita terms using our aggregation method, however, the con-
sumption of the newly born cohort does not drop out:






This equation has a simple interpretation. Notice, ﬁr s to fa l l ,t h a tf o r
n =0 , (24) simply reduces to the standard consumption Euler equation for
representative agent models. Such a result would also occur, were it the case
that average consumption in the population, cs, were equal to consumption
of the newborn, cs+1
s+1. This cannot be the case, however, as the new cohort
11are born with no nonhuman wealth by assumption and as a consequence,
their consumption must be less than the average level in the population.
This “disconnectedness” — to use Weil’s term — depresses the growth rate of
aggregate consumption and gives rise to non-Ricardian results.
We derive the per capita consumption Euler equation in terms of only
per capita variables in two steps: we inially derive the Euler equation for
full consumption and then relate this expression directly to c.U s i n gt h ep e r













Upon further simpliﬁcation, this equation can be transformed into a















For our purposes in this paper, it is more useful to work with this rela-
tionship in terms of nonhuman wealth, however. Substituting out for ht+1
using (19) yields the per capita Euler equation for full consumption:
β (1 + rs+1)b cs = b cs+1 + n(1 − β)as+1 (27)
The per capita Euler equation for goods consumption then follows di-
rectly from (23):




This is the central equation in the paper. Comparing (28) with (24), we
see that the diﬀerence between average consumption and consumption of the
12newly born is simply the marginal propensity to consume times aggregate
nonhuman wealth. The higher the level of nonhuman wealth, the greater the
diﬀerence cs and cs+1
s+1 and the lower the optimal growth rate of aggregate
consumption.
2.4 Pricing Assumptions
We model the supply side in an extremely simplistic fashion. Denote the
current period as s = t. The current price level is assumed to be ﬁxed
exogenously, Pt = Pt, whereas the sequence of future price levels, {Ps}
∞
s=t+1,
a r ea s s u m e dt ob ep e r f e c t l yﬂexible. In addition to this, there exists each
period an exogenous, constant, “full capacity” level of output, y,w h i c ht h e
economy needs to reach to prevent a recession. One may thus imagine the
current supply curve as a horizontal line at Pt, with full capacity chosen
exogenously; clearly, nothing prevents current output deviating from this
level and so yt,i np e r i o dt is endogenous. For all future periods, however, the
supply curve will be vertical at the full capacity level (hence the output gap
will be zero) and the price level rather than the output gap is endogenous.
2.5 Policy Regime
In order to close the model, it remains to specify the government’s ﬁscal
and monetary policy. Govenment activity here is restricted to the printing
of (or destruction of) money; both government consumption and the stock of
public debt are assumed to be zero at every point in time3.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally,
monetary policy is speciﬁed by a positive, exogenous sequence of per capita
money supplies {Ms}
∞
s=t. Fiscal policy in turn is speciﬁed so that each
3We make these assumptions in order to focus on the monetary aspects of the model. As
the Ricardian debt neutrality proposition does not hold in this overlapping generations
set-up, however, the zero public debt assumption is not an entirely innocuous one. In
particular, the equivalence between transfers or Friedman-style helicopter-drops and open
market operations breaks down here as we discuss in more detail later on.
13element of the sequence {Bs}
∞
s=t equals zero. The government’s ﬂow budget
constraint, in nominal per capita terms, is therefore given by:






3.1 Aggregate Consistency Conditions
In equilibrium, the goods and asset markets must clear:





∀s ≥ t. As, by assumption, output is not storable and the government
does not issue debt, the latter condition states that all aggregate nonhuman
wealth must be held in the form of real balances. Through (31), we therefore
abstract from the usual critique of the Pigou eﬀect, originally due to Kalecki
[1944], that, being dwarfed in relative magnitude by other outside assets,
increases real balances of all but extremely large magnitudes will fail to
have a sizeable impact on aggregate ﬁnancial wealth. Our framework would
thus seem to be heavily biased towards ﬁn d i n gi nf a v o u ro ft h eP i g o v i a nr e a l
balance eﬀect.
Combining (28) and (20) with the market clearing conditions (30), (31)
a n do u ra s s u m p t i o n so np r i c i n ga n dt e c h n o l o g yg i v e s :
β (1 + it+1)
Pt
Pt+1












3.2 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
A perfect foresight equilibrium is a set of solutions yt, {Ps,is}
∞
s=t+1 satisfying
(32), (33), non-negativity constraints on real balances, Ms
Ps ≥ 0 ∀s ≥ t,a n d
each cohort’s consumption at birth, cs




The solution method we employ is to ﬁr s to fa l ls o l v ef o rt h es e q u e n c e
of ﬂexible prices, {Ps}
∞
s=t+1, and future nominal interest rates, {is}
∞
s=t+2,
a n dt h e nu s et h es o l u t i o nf o rPt+1 to ﬁnd current values of output and the
nominal interest rate.
3.2.1 Solving for the Path of Future Prices and Interest Rates
Combining (32) with (33) and a little algebra (see part 1 of the appendix
for details), we arrive at the basic law of motion governing the dynamics of
real balances, m ≡ M
P (or equivalently the price level) in periods t+1, t+2
and so on:












where µs ≡ (1 + n)Ms/Ms−1 denotes the gross growth rate of the aggregate
nominal money stock between periods s − 1 ands.A s mt+1, like Pt+1,i s
a nonpredetermined, “jump” variable, (34) must be solved in a forward-
looking manner, in which mt+1 is determined as the value that causes the
resulting sequence {ms}
∞
s=t+2 to be non-divergent. For this sequence to also
be unique, we require the usual saddlepath condition that the derivative
of the right-hand side of (34) with respect to mt+2 at the steady state is
strictly less than one in absolute value. In general, this solution will make
15mt+1 a function of the entire future sequence of money growth rates. If we
make the simplifying assumption that these growth rates are constant from
period t +1onwards at µ, however, then the unique non-explosive solution
to (34) will be the steady state value, m∗.

















The equation has two distinct real roots, but only its largest root satisﬁes
the requirement that real balances be non-negative, and this is given by:
m∗ = φ(n,µ)y (36)
where φ(n,µ) ≡ 1
2nκ
½
−[µ − χnκ − β (1 + n)] +
q




As in the representative agent model with logarithmic preferences, the steady
state here has a unit income elasticity of money demand.





Solving for the sequence of future nominal interest rates is even more
simple. Rearranging (33), we see that the nominal interest rate in all future





3.2.2 The IS-LM Equilibrium
We are now ready to solve for the current level of output and the nominal
interest rate. For this purpose, we combine (32) and (33) with (37) to form
16a system of two equations in two unknowns:


















As is common practice in monetary theory papers nowadays, we will
label (39) and (40) microfounded IS and LM curves, in reference to the
famous workhorse model of undergraduate macro textbooks. Whilst the re-
semblance of (40) to a Hicksian LM curve is clear enough, the connection
between (39) and the Hicksian IS curve breaks down in one crucial aspect:
the presence of period t real balances on the right hand side when n>0.
As an implication, this framework has the interesting property that there
exists a positive relationship between current real balances and current out-
put, holding constant the real interest rate. My claim is that, of all the
microfounded real balance eﬀects discussed in this paper, this particular
mechanism comes closest to the one advocated by Pigou [1943] in his rebut-
tal to Keynes’ challenge to classical theory. But ﬁrst, let us discuss how this
feature alters the determination of income and the nominal rate.




















The transmission mechanism works as follows. Holding constant Mt+1,
when the monetary authority increases Mt,t h i sh a st w oe ﬀects on incentives
for current spending: (i) a standard liquidity eﬀect l e a d i n gt oaf a l li nit+1
and the real interest rate, rt+1; and (ii) a real balance eﬀect, whereby the
17policy change leads to an increase in aggregate nonhuman wealth at the
beginning of period t +1 . This, in turn, decreases the optimal growth rate
of average consumption and as future consumption is ﬁxed at y,t h a tm e a n s
higher consumption and output today. We provide further intuition for this
latter eﬀect below. When the monetary authority increases Mt+1, there is
an expected inﬂation eﬀect which raises Pt+1 and lowers real interest rates.
The ﬁrst and second arguments in the function y therefore have positive
partial derivatives.
4 The Liquidity Trap
4.1 Money, Wealth and the Pigou Eﬀect
Our purpose in this paper is to analyse this transmission mechanism in ex-
tremis when the economy is caught in a liquidity trap, deﬁned as in Aikman
[2000]:
Deﬁnition 1 A liquidity trap will be said to occur whenever temporary
changes in the current nominal stock of money — that is, changes in Mt
which leave the sequence {Ms}
∞
s=t+1 unchanged — are incapable of matching
aggregate demand with full capacity output.
We initially characterise the n =0case4. In order to establish that
liquidity traps are possible in representative agent models, it suﬃces to














1 − β (µ)
−1
´´ (42)
4The reader may wish to consult Aikman [2002] for a more complete description of this
case.












Graphically, this represents the level of demand where the IS curve crosses
the horizontal axis in (yt,i t+1) space. It is perfectly feasible that this level
of demand lies below y.S t a r t i n gf r o myt = y, a permanent time preference
shock5, for instance, which raised β suﬃciently high could cause such an
outcome. In IS-LM terms, this shock would shift the IS curve (drawn for a
given level of expected inﬂation) leftwards and if the shock was of suﬃcient
magnitude, this could cause the horizontal intercept of the curve to lie below










Such a shock is certainly feasible, provided expected inﬂa t i o na so fp e r i o dt
is negative.
We now turn our attention to the more interesting n>0 case. Taking







the supply of money is expanded to inﬁnity, therefore, aggregate demand
increases without bound. This fact, therefore, may lead us to conclude that
the real balance eﬀect generated by this framework completely eliminates
the possibility of a liquidity trap as deﬁned above.
5Following Krugman [1998], Aikman [2002] considered a shock that permanently re-
duced the full capacity level of output from period t +1onwards. Our use of loga-
rithmic preferences, combined with the assumption that policy sets exogenous monetary
targets implies that such a shock would not cause a trap here (see Aikman [2002] for fuller
discussion).
194.1.1 Monetary Wealth Eﬀects
W h yi si tt h a tar e a lb a l a n c ee ﬀect operating through wealth only occurs
when n>0? To gain a general insight into the mechanism at work, let us
























j=t+1(1+rj) is the discount factor. As we show in part 2 of the
appendix, (46) can be combined with (28) and (31) to equivalently express










where ∆ ≡ 1 − β (1 + n) and Ωm




























We initially analyse Ωm
t for the n =0 , representative agent case. Here,
the third term on the right-hand side of (48) drops out, and net per capita
wealth will be the sum of nonhuman monetary wealth (
Mt−1
Pt )a n dh u m a n
monetary wealth (the discounted value of the stream of real transfers), less
the present discounted value of the sequence of opportunity costs incurred
when wealth is held in monetary form.
As we show in part 2 of the appendix, Ωm
t ≡ 0 when n =0 , for all paths
of real and nominal interest rates, . This result, originally due to Sachs
[1980] and Cohen [1985] — who both prove it for the continuous time case
20— explains why the representative agent model analysed by Krugman does
not display a real balance eﬀect. With Ωm
t equal to zero, (47) implies that
monetary policy will only inﬂuence demand to the extent that it inﬂuences
the equilibrium path of real interest rates in
P∞
i=tλiyi.
Intuitively, without population growth, the households owning the cur-
rent money stock are exactly the same households who receive all the trans-
fers and incur all the opportunity costs involved in carrying the money stock.
These three components of wealth always exactly cancel when n =0 .A s
Weil [1991] discusses, this result is a modality of the Ricardian debt neu-
trality proposition, and as we now go on to show for the n>0 case, the
conditions that cause Ricardian equivalence to break down are exactly the
same conditions required for money to enter the model as net wealth.
When n>0, as we show in the appendix, Ωm


















In this case, the real value of current monetary wealth exceeds the present
discounted value of the future opportunity costs of holding money incurred
by the currently alive consumers. This is because future opportunity costs
fall partly upon future cohorts whose consumption is not valued by agents
currently alive. Money is therefore net wealth in the sense that the stock of
money enters the consumption function in a nontrivial way.
4.2 Intergenerational Eﬀects and a Very Keynesian Conclu-
sion
When n =0 , the monetary authority can, in principle, engineer temporary
changes in the current stock of money of any size. This is because the
representative household in that case can always use its current stock of
real balances to ﬁnance the lump-sum taxes required to contract the money
21supply in future. When n>0, however, this is not the case; households
born in period t+1have zero initial ﬁnancial wealth and the growth rate of
the money stock between periods t and t +1must be suﬃciently high that
these households can aﬀord to pay the taxes and still consume. Part 3 of
the appendix shows that the nonnegativity constraint on ct+1
t+1 holds if and
only if:




Intuitively, if Mt becomes too large relative to Mt+1,t h el u m p - s u mt a x
required to contract the money supply in period t +1 , τt+1, will be so
h i g ht h a th u m a nw e a l t ha so fp e r i o dt +1will be negative. As the newly
born cohort in t +1have no other assets to fall back on, such a path for
the money supply would imply negative consumption for this cohort. The
nonnegativity constraint on ct+1
t+1 will, of course, also have implications for
the set of feasible long run rates of growth of the money stock, and we also
characterise this set in part three of the appendix.
This brings us directly back to our analysis of the possibility of liquidity
traps occurring when n>0. We showed above that aggregate demand in this
case expands without bound in the limit as the money supply is increased
to inﬁnity and put forward the claim that this ruled out the possibility of
a liquidity trap occurring under this paper’s deﬁnition. It is now clear,
however, that such reasoning was incorrect, as temporary increases in the
stock of money of this size would violate the nonnegativity constraint on the
consumption of the newly born in t +1 ,( 5 0 ) .





lie below the full capacity level of output. Evaluating this expression, we




Mt+1 (1 + n)
Ptφ(n,µ)[β + χκ(1 + n)]
(51)
22The maximum level of demand is therefore proportional to
Mt+1
P ,w i t h
the coeﬃcient of proportionality simply being a collection of parameters that
are independent of y. Without a priori restrictions on technology and tastes,




lying below y and
we can conclude that, in principle, liquidity traps are certainly possible when
n>0.
More practical readers may still be wondering, however, whether such an
outcome represents anything other than a remote possibility? As a prelimi-
nary step in shedding some light on the problem, multiply both numerator
and denominator by Pt+1 and use the steady state solution for real balances







Given that n, χ and κ are all likely to be small numbers, the expected
deﬂation required to cause a liquidity trap when n>0 would not appear to
be that diﬀerent from the n =0case, suggesting that the incorporation of
the real balance eﬀect does not oﬀer substantially greater protection from a
liquidity trap. We now sharpen this reasoning with a simple calibration of
the model’s key parameters.
I fw et a k eap e r i o dt oe q u a lo n ey e a r ,t h e nav a l u eo f0.957 for the sub-
jective time discount factor, β, would correspond to Cooley and Prescott’s
[1995] calibration. For the steady state annual growth rate of the nominal
money stock, we choose 5 percent, implying µ =1 .05. Following Ireland
[2001], we calibrate the annual population growth rate, n,a t1 percent (a
value also considered by Weil [1991]) and ﬁnally χ is set at 0.0127,av a l u e
that implies that the ratio of real money balances to real output in the steady
state is 0.16. Walsh [1998] argues that such a value roughly corresponds to
the real value of M1 relative to GDP in the U.S. in the early 1990s.





23required to cause a liquidity trap in the n =0and n>0 cases are 4.3 percent
and 5.2 percent respectively. Furthermore, we can apply these values directly
to (43) and (51) to obtain expressions for the maximum feasible levels of
demand (as a function of Mt+1 and Pt) resulting from temporary changes
in Mt.W h e nn =0 , limMt−→∞ yt =7 .29
Mt+1
Pt ;w h e nn>0, limMt−→ c Mt yt =
6.31
Mt+1
Pt . The maximum feasible level of demand when the real balance
eﬀect is operative therefore lies to the left of the level without the real























Figure 1: A Liquidity Trap With and Without the Real Balance Eﬀect
24In each case, we begin at point A, where demand equals the full capacity
level of output. Following the increase in β, the IS curve shifts leftwards to
IS’, implying a new equilibrium at point B. The central bank, wishing to
restore the full capacity equilibrium, then raises Mt and this shifts the LM
curve rightwards as in the textbook IS-LM model, but also the IS curve
rightwards when n>0. The movement from B to C represents the largest
feasible eﬀect on demand with and without the real balance eﬀect. In the
upper diagram, which corresponds to the n =0case, the current money
supply is expanded to inﬁnity and this brings nominal interest rates down
to zero; nevertheless, the horizontal intercept of IS is the highest level of
demand feasible. When n>0, however, the upper bound to Mt is c Mt
rather than ∞, and as the lower diagram illustrates, under our back-of-the-
envelope calibration, the highest feasible level of demand is actually less
than in the former case.
What then is the intuition for this perhaps at ﬁrst sight surprising degree
of policy ineﬀectiveness in the model incorporating the real balance eﬀect?
The result becomes even more surprising when we apply our calibration to
the money growth constraint (50): it permits the central bank to expand
the current money stock to 147 times its t +1value! So what is driving
the ineﬀectiveness result? The answer becomes clear once we examine the
magnitude of the real balance eﬀect under our chosen calibration. The
size of this eﬀect is eﬀectively determined by the product nκ and under
our parameter values, this is extremely small at 0.0004. Therefore, while
the constraint (50) allows for truly enormous gyrations in the money stock
between periods t and t+1, the real balance eﬀect is so weak that even these
movements have little impact on demand.
Our results, therefore, contrast sharply to those of Ireland [2001]. Rather
than eliminating the possibility of liquidity traps occurring, the real balance
eﬀect generated by this model makes a trap more likely as it heightens the
25constraints on the monetary authority.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have used Weil’s [1991] monetary, overlapping inﬁnitely-
lived dynasties framework to analyse a microfounded version of the real
balance eﬀect envisaged by Pigou. This eﬀect appears to imply that tempo-
rary monetary expansions can have an unboundedly large impact on current
aggregate demand, thereby eliminating Krugman’s liquidity trap. The cir-
cumstances under which such an eﬀect is operative, however, imply a condi-
tion that rules out temporary monetary expansions of this magnitude. We
then showed that for the set of feasible monetary expansions, liquidity traps
are possible and, under our simple calibration of the model, more likely.
This result contrasts sharply with Ireland [2001].
We conclude with some thoughts for further research using this frame-
work. The ﬁrst topic would be to extend this paper to analyse the optimal
monetary response to shocks that cause a liquidity trap. Notwithstanding
the obvious diﬃculties in deﬁning a social welfare function with heteroge-
neous agents, such a study would certainly be interesting as an OLG frame-
work is likely to yield very diﬀerent results from the representative agent
case. The clearest such diﬀerence would surely revolve around the relative
merits of temporary versus permanent monetary expansions. As discussed
in this paper, temporary expansions imply an increase in future lump-sum
taxes and this will have proportionally the greatest impact on future cohorts
as they have no other assets to fall back on. As permanent monetary expan-
sions also have distributional consequences, we could analyse the optimality
of Krugman’s suggestion of credibly committing to being irresponsible.
A second avenue of research that might prove fruitful would be to com-
bine this framework with the expectational liquidity trap put forward by
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2001], [2002]. Conceptually and ob-
26servationally quite distinct from Krugman’s liquidity trap, these authors
view the trap as a failure to coordinate expectations on the stable inﬂation
equilibrium. Self-fulﬁlling deﬂations are usually ruled out as possible per-
fect foresight equilibrium paths by appealing to the transversality condition.
Benhabib et al., however, specify a policy regime in which the transversality
condition necessarily holds, regardless of the evolution of the endogenous
variables, and so this argument cannot apply. Their policy regime has a
particular implication for the dynamic behaviour of ﬁnancial wealth (money
plus bonds outstanding) and in our framework, this would inﬂuence, and be
inﬂuenced by, demand via the per capita consumption Euler equation.
6 Appendix
6.1 Deriving the Law of Motion Governing Real Balances
for Periods t +1Onwards
Using (33) to substitute out it+1 in (32), and forwarding by one period, we


















































































































equation in the text.
6.2 Net Monetary Wealth
6.2.1 Deriving the Per Capita Consumption Function (47)




















































where ∆ ≡ 1 − β (1 + n) and λi ≡
(1+n)i−t
Qi
j=t+1(1+rj) . Combining this with the
per capita lifetime constraint and the asset market clearing condition (31)
then yields equation (47) in the text.
286.2.2 Characterising Ωm
t
We begin with the n =0case. The economy’s net per capita monetary























Using the government budget constraint τi =
Mi−Mi−1
Pi , we can expand































































where the latter equality comes from imposing the Fisher equation, link-
ing real and nominal interest rates. Clearly the ﬁrst two terms in Ωm
t are
identically equal to the third term and Ωm
t ≡ 0.
For the case where n>0,w ec o n t i n u et of o l l o wt h es a m et a c k . H e r e ,


























Once again using the government’s ﬂow constraint (29), we can expand

























































































Adding this to terms three and four in Ωm
t then gives the expression in
the text.
6.3 Restrictions on Admissible Monetary Policies
6.3.1 Ensuring that Consumption at Birth is Nonnegative
In equilibrium, we require that consumption at birth cυ
υ be nonnegative — a
necessary and suﬃcient condition guaranteeing that cυ
s ≥ 0 for all s>υ ≥ t.
Since dynasties are born with zero ﬁnancial wealth, this amounts — when
n>0 — to imposing the restriction that human wealth be nonnegative (see
(17)). From (19) and (23), with the prior imposition of the market clearing






∀s ≥ t.F o rs = t +1and using (37), this inequality implies a lower bound
for the feasible set of growth rates for the nominal money stock between
periods t and t +1 :




For s = t+2, t+3a n do n w a r d s ,i ti m p l i e sa nu p p e rb o u n df o rt h es t e a d y




From the deﬁnition of the quadratic polynominal Ψ(m∗), an equivalent





≥ 0. Simplifying, this implies
al o w e rb o u n dt ot h ef e a s i b l es e to fsteady state monetary growth rates, µ:
µ ≥ χκ + β (A2)




In addition to the above, we also require a restriction on the steady state
money growth rate to ensure that (34) has a saddlepath solution. As usual,













This condition implicitly places a lower bound on the admissible rate of
money growth in the steady state, µ. Notice that, when n =0 ,( A 3 )r e d u c e s
to the standard requirement that the per capita rate of money growth exceed
the discount factor, β. Depending upon the particular calibration chosen,
one of the conditions (A2) and (A3) will in general be redundant.
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